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The U.S. public pension crisis, which arose when "[public] . . .
employees, taxpayers, and investors . . . became concerned about the
underfunding of [public] . . . pension plans,"' has led to a profound change
in state budgetary priorities.2  Some U.S. states, for example, have raised
taxes to ensure that public pensions are adequately funded.3 Others have
offered fewer public services, in order to reduce their unfunded pension
liabilities.4  A third group has made better use of scarce public sector
resources, especially because Chapter 9 bankruptcy is not available to any
U.S. state.5
Making better use of public sector resources may be the single best
way to deal with the U.S. public pension crisis, because it is a more
politically viable alternative to tax increases and spending cuts.6  This
approach also has lower opportunity costs, which are defined as the
"amount of other goods and services rthat] . . . could have been obtained
instead [of the selected option]." Lastly, it helps to identify government
failures,8 such as spiking.9 In other words, this approach is a cost-justified
response to the U.S. public pension crisis.
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I. Julie Roin, Planning Past Pensions, 46 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 747, 750-51 (2015).
2. See generally Iris J. Lay & Dylan Grundman, A Balanced Approach to Closing State Deficits, Ctr.
on Budget & Pol'y Priorities 2 (Feb. 25, 2011), http://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/
files/2-16-10sfp.pdf.
3. Id. at 7-8.
4. Id. at 2.
5. While Chapter 9 bankruptcy is not available to U.S. states, it may be used by local governments
and other non-state entities. See U.S.C. § 109(c)1 (2012).
6. See Lay & Grundman, supra note 2, at 1-2.
7. John Black, OXFORD DICTIONARY OF EcoNoMICS 332, Opportunity Cost (2d ed. 2002).
8. See Clifford Winston, Government Failure vs. Market Failure: Microeconomics Policy Research
and Government Performance, BROOKINGS (Sept. 2006)), http://www.brookings.edu/
research/papers/2006/09/monetarypolicy-winston ("[Government failures arise] . . . when
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By presenting a detailed case study, which focuses on the public
pension crisis in a single jurisdiction, Illinois,to this article describes one
way to make better use of public sector resources. It does so by critically
assessing the case of Illinois," which is the worst funded public pension
system in the entire country.12 Despite its last-place standing, Illinois still
"provides a reasonably good illustration of the public pension problems
facing many U.S. states"13 because it adheres to the majority legal rule, i.e.,
that public pensions are valid common law contracts.14  As a result, this
article also explains how other U.S. states could address their own public
pension issues.
Specifically, this article focuses on one of the primary sources of
public pension inefficiencies: defined-benefit pension plans.15  Defined-
benefit pension plans operate by awarding public employees a fixed amount
of money, and other fringe benefits, upon retirement. The cost of
government has created inefficiencies because it should not have intervened [in a particular
market] . . . in the first place or when [that government] . . . could have solved a given
problem . . . more efficiently .. .by generating greater net benefits.").
9. "Spiking" refers to the practice of "artificially inflating pensionable salary." See Civic
Federation, Illinois Pension Primer: A Plain-English Guide to Public Employee Pensions in the
State ofIllinois 9 (April 22, 2015).
10. See Honor Moore, The Public Pension Reform Problem, 22 ELDER L. J. 249, 251 (2014) ("The
complexity and severity of the pension crises in Illinois puts the state in a unique position to serve
as an example for other [U.S.] . . .states that are experiencing pension crises.").
11. Id. at 251 ("In Illinois, strict legal requirements and intense political pressures forces legislators to
be very careful and creative in developing ways to reduce the state's liabilities while upholding
the contractual rights of public employees.").
12. Martin Z. Braun, State Pension Funding Levels In U.S. Improve For A Second Year,
BLOOMBERG, Oct. 12, 2015, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-10-13/state-pension-
funding-levels-in-u-s-improve-for-a-second-year ("Illinois with a pension shortfall of more than
$100 billion, remains the state with [the] .. . worse funded retirement system, with a ratio of
assets to liabilities of 39.3 percent.")
13. Roin, supra note 1, at 751-52.
14. See Eric M. Madiar, Public Pension Benefits Under Siege: Does State Law Facilitate or Block
Recent Efforts to Cut the Pension Benefits of Public Servants?, 27 ABA J. LAB. & EMP. L. 179,
181-2 (2012):
Most [U.S.] . .. states follow the contractual approach . . . In Illinois, . . . by joining a
pension system, public employees obtain absolute 'vested' rights in the pension plan,
including later benefit increases added during their service. These rights cannot be
unilaterally changed by the legislature under any circumstances, but the rights may be
modified via legitimate contract principles (an offer, new consideration, and voluntary
employee acceptance).
15. The author uses the term "defined-benefit pension plans" to describe one way to deliver
"retirement annuity benefits." This mechanism for delivering retirement benefits has been around
for a long-time and remains a very popular option. See Robert Clark, Evolution of Public-Sector
Retirement Plans: Crisis, Challenges, and Change, 27 ABA J. LAB. & EMP. L. 257, 262 (2012)
("By the middle of the twentieth century, virtually all [U.S.] . . . states provided . . . define benefit
plans ... to their employees.").
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administering defined-benefit plans, traditionally, was borne by public
employers.16
Despite their popularity, defined-benefit pension plans are a relatively
inefficient way to deliver retirement annuity benefits,17  at least in
conventional economic terms, 18 for a variety of reasons.19 One such reason
is that many defined-benefit pension plans generate unfunded pension
liabilities due to "the mismatch between the assets in [these] defined-benefit
pension plans (primarily equities) and [their] . . . liabilities (deferred fixed
annuities)."20 This mismatch therefore should be avoided, in order to limit
unfunded pension liabilities. A simple way for U.S. states, such as Illinois,
to achieve this goal is to move away from defined-benefit pension plans.21
Among the biggest obstacles to moving away from defined-benefit
pension plans, at least in cases where both parties agree to modify a valid
public pension contract, is the common law requirement of fresh
consideration.22  This requirement assumes that any subsequent
modification to a valid common law contract will be unenforceable, unless
both parties receive additional consideration.23  This fresh consideration
16. See Civic Federation, supra note 9, at 5 ("In Illinois [, almost all public pensions are defined-
benefit pension plans, which]... are funded through employer and employee contributions and
investment earnings.").
17. See Zvi Bodie, Mismatch Risk, Government Guarantees, and Financial Instability: The Case of
the US. Pension System, 8 INT'L J. OF CENTRAL BANKING 273, 274-5 (2012),
http://www.ijcb.org/joumal/ijcbl2q0al5.pdf
18. In comparison, moving away from defined benefit pension plans may be economically efficient
because public employers, state taxpayers and public employees are all better off by sharing the
risk of loss. See Richard Posner, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 1. 2 Value, Utility, Efficiency (9th
ed. 2014) ("The social goal most emphasized in modem economics is not happiness or utility, but
the efficient allocation of resources in a somewhat special sense. . . . A Pareto-superior transaction
(or 'Pareto improvement') is one that makes at least one person better off and no one worse off.").
19. See, e.g., Civic Federation, supra note 9, at 6. For example, the fact that the risk of loss is placed
solely upon public employers raises the possibility of moral hazard or "the danger that if a
contract promises people payments on certain conditions, they will change their conduct so as to
make these conditions more likely to occur." Black, supra note 7, at 308-09. An example of how
some public employees change their conduct in order to make it more likely that their public
pensions grow is the practice of spiking.
20. Zvi Bodie, supra note 16, at 273.
21. In fact, there may be some non-economic benefits that result from using defined-benefit pension
plans such as increased loyalty to public employers. In cases where U.S. states choose to continue
using defined-benefit pension plans, for whatever reasons, it may be prudent to employ the use of
legal lists. Legal lists describe the types of investments that public pension funds should make.
See Legal Lists, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/
/legallist.asp?adtestterm_page_v14_v2 ("A selection of eligible companies and investments,
determined by . . . state governments, for institutions such as insurance companies and pension
plans [to invest in] . . . These [legal lists focus on] . . . low risk, low [volatility options that] ...
insure the well-being of investors ... where safety of principal is of concern.").
22. The requirement of fresh, or new, consideration was imposed in response to the common law pre-
existing duty rule. See Joseph M. Perillo, CONTRACTS § 5.14 (7th ed., 2014) ("Under the pre-
existing duty rule, a binding agreement o modify a contract requires consideration.").
23. Id.
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must be provided, in keeping with the pre-existing duty rule, except in
situations when "changed circumstances" or another valid exception is
raised by a party. 24
Within this context, a fresh consideration dilemma may arise because
one, or both, of the parties cannot offer additional consideration. This
dilemma, however, may be overcome by using Pension Waiver Credits.25
This new tax expenditure concept,26 which is described for the first time in
this article,27 achieves its goal by providing fresh consideration for each of
the parties. This additional consideration takes two forms: a new tax credit
allocation (i.e., this tax expenditure provides early access to retirement
benefits, which would otherwise be accessible upon retirement, and thereby
provides fresh consideration for public employees) and the right to
discontinue offering defined-benefit pension plans (i.e., the waiver of this
legal duty, which would otherwise need to be discharged, serves as fresh
consideration for public employers). Because this fresh consideration is not
tied to any pre-existing duty, and meets every other requirement,28 Pension
24. See Jason Scott Johnston, Default Rules/Mandatory Principles: A Game Theoretic Analysis of
Good Faith and the Contract Modification Program, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L. J. 337, 366-71
(1993).
Insofar as the ultimate purpose to be served by a legal rule on modification is to
enforce modifications that are based on actual changed circumstances not already
accounted for in the contract price, and not to enforce those modifications that are
simply extortionate hold-up attempts, the pre-existing duty rule was both
underinclusive and overinclusive.
Other potentially valid exceptions to the pre-existing duty rule may include mutual rescission,
reliance and waiver. See Comeill A. Stephens, Abandoning the Pre-Existing Duty Rule:
Eliminating the Unnecessary, 8 Hous. Bus. & TAX L.J. 355, 366-71 (2008).
25. The term "waiver" is defined, at least for purposes of this article, as "the release of claims
pursuant to a private agreement between a person and his or her current or former employee."
Daniel P. O'Gorman, A State of Disarray: The 'Knowing and Voluntary' Standard for Releasing
Claims Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 8 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 73, 73 n.4
(2005).
26. See Stanley S. Surrey, The Tax Expenditure Concept and the Budget Reform Act of 1974, 17 B.C.
INDUS. & COM. L. REv. 679, 679-80 (1976):
Essentially, the tax expenditure concept . . . regards such a tax as composed of two
distinct elements. The first element contains the structural provisions necessary to the
application of a normal income tax... . These provisions compose the revenue raising
aspects of the tax. The second element consists of the special preferences found in
every income tax. These special preferences, often called tax incentives or tax
subsidies, are departures from the normal tax structure and are designed to favor a
particular industry, activity or class of persons.
27. The author of this article, Randall K. Johnson, initially developed the concept of "Pension Waiver
Credits" in 2012.
28. A valid common law contract, and any subsequent modification of such a contract, requires an
offer, an acceptance, consideration on both sides, no defenses to contract formation and no
defenses to contract performance. See generally Williston, CONTRACTS § 1.1 (4th ed. Lord 1990).
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Waiver Credits resolve the fresh consideration dilemma for public pension
contracts.29
The article proceeds in four parts. First, this article describes the
applicable law for U.S. public pensions.30  Next, it explains how to limit
public pension inefficiencies, at least on a prospective basis, by moving
away from defined-benefit pension plans. Third, the article describes one
way to move beyond defined-benefit pension plans by calling for the
creation of a new state tax expenditure program (specifically, a Pension
Waiver Credits Program). Finally, it explains how U.S. states could
implement this tax expenditure program in order to partially address the
U.S. public pension crisis.
II. APPLICABLE LAW
For the last forty years, U.S. states were not legally "required to fund
their [public] . . . pension promises."3 1 This lack of regulation gave public
employers an implied legal right to withhold information, to use
questionable practices and to not insure public pensions.3 2  The 1974
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) enabled each of these
implied legal rights.3 3
Subsequent federal regulation impaired these implied legal rights, so
as to encourage the disclosure of more public pension information.34 This
regulation required every U.S. state "to disclose the difference between the
present value of accrued pension benefits and the fair market value of the
assets . . . set aside to pay them."35 These state disclosures had to be made
by 2010, as required by the 2004 rules that were issued by the Government
Accounting Standards Board.36
29. This dilemma is resolved, at least with respect to the modification of public pension contracts in
Illinois, because Pension Waiver Credits provide an opportunity to gain early access to vested
public pension benefits (the fresh consideration for public employees) as well as to discontinue
offering defined-benefit pension plans to public employees (the fresh consideration for public
employers).
30. This description of the applicable law includes a series of recent state court decisions, which
expressly focus on public sector pensions. See, e.g., Heaton v. Quinn (In re Pension Reform
Litig.), 2015 IL 118585, 32 N.E.3d I (Ill. 2015) (holding that enacted legislation that sought to
unilaterally modify public pensions was void and unenforceable because it violated the Pension
Protection Clause of the Illinois Constitution of 1970).
31. Roin, supra note 1, at 748.
32. See id. at 748-49.
33. Id. at 748 ("In 1974, Congress made a calculated decision to exclude governmental plans from the
strictures of its landmark pension legislation, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA)."); 29 U.S.C. § 1003 (2012).
34. See Roin, supra note 1, at 750-51.
35. Id., at 751.
36. Id. at 750.
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These mandatory disclosures were just the start of a broad reform
effort, which sought to assure the payment of unfunded pension liabilities.37
Additional public pension reforms were enacted under state and local law.38
A representative example of a state reform was Illinois Public Act 98-
0599.39
Public Act 98-0599, which was enacted by the Illinois General
Assembly in 2013,40 operated in several ways.4' First, the statute
eliminated guaranteed cost-of-living increases.42 Public Act 98-0599 also
increased the minimum retirement age for public employees.43  Lastly, it
limited the computational basis for determining future retirement benefits.44
Public Act 98-0599, in other words, ensured that most costs were borne by
both parties to a public pension contract (i.e., public employers and public
employees).
This statute was subsequently challenged in an Illinois Supreme Court
case, In Re Pension Reform Litigation.45  This state court case resolved
three legal issues.46  The first issue was whether "Public Act 98-0599's
reduction of retirement annuity benefits owed to members of [Illinois'] ...
retirement systems violate the pension protection clause [of the Illinois
Constitution of 1970?]"47 The second issue was "if [the statute violated the
37. Id. at 750-51.
38. Cf Paris Schulz, Plan to Fund Chicago Police, Fire Pensions Surfaces in Springfield, Chicago
Tonight, CHICAGO TONIGHT (May 29, 2015 7:23 pm),
http://chicagotonight.wttw.com/2015/05/29/plan-fund-chicago-police-fire-pensions-surfaces-
springfield:
A much anticipated plan to shore up Chicago's . . . pension plan funds has finally
surfaced in Springfield. The measure would double the city's payment into the fund
next year and triple it in the next five years . . .. The bill does not call for benefit
reductions or increased contributions . . . . But city officials say they are still
negotiating with unions to achieve some level of reform to go along with the new
projected revenue.







45. In re Pension Reform Litigation, 2015 IL 118585, 32 N.E.3d 1 (111. 2015).
46. Id.at2015ILll8585143,32N.E.3datl6:
Three issues are presented for. . . review: (1) does Public Act 98-599's reduction of
retirement annuity benefits owed to members of the GRS [General Assembly
Retirement System] . . . , SERS [State Employees' Retirement System] . . . , SURS
[State Universities Retirement System] . . . , and TRS [Teachers' Retirement
System] . . . retirement systems violate the pension protection clause set forth in article
XII, section 5, of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 (Ill. Const. 1970, art. XIII, § 5); (2)
if so, can the law's reduction of those benefits nevertheless be upheld as a proper
exercise of the State's police power; and (3) if not, are the invalid provisions of Public
Act 98-599 severable from the remainder of the statute?
47. Id.
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Pension Protection Clause] can the law's reduction of those benefits
nevertheless be upheld as a proper exercise of the State's police power
[?]",48 The third issue was "if [there is no proper exercise of Illinois's
police power] . . . , are the invalid provisions of Public Act 98-0599
severable from the remainder of the statute?"49 As each of these issues
were resolved in the plaintiffs' favor, Public Act 98-0599 was held to be
unconstitutional.50
The first issue was the most relevant for the purposes of scholarly
discussion because it underscored the fact that unilateral modifications are
not an option in Illinois. This issue also was important because it focused
attention on the legal status of public pensions. Furthermore, it established
that public pensions are valid common law contracts, which are protected
under Illinois law. Lastly, the issue helped to explain why public pensions
may not be unilaterally modified (or even bilaterally modified by agreement
of the parties, at least without a showing that fresh consideration will be
provided on both sides of the proposed deal).
In undertaking its analysis, the court found that the language used in
the Pension Protection Clause of the Illinois Constitution was essential to
the resolution of In Re Pension Reform Litigation. This language states, in
relevant part, that: "membership in any pension or retirement system of the
State . . . shall be an enforceable contractual relationship, the benefits of
which shall not be diminished or impaired."5' The Pension Protection
Clause went into effect with the Illinois Constitution of 1970.
The Illinois Supreme Court also found "that the clause means
precisely what it says: if something qualifies as a benefit of the enforceable
contractual relationship resulting from membership in one of the State's
pension and retirement systems, it cannot be diminished or impaired."52 In
making this finding, the court emphasized that: "retirement annuity benefits
are unquestionably a 'benefit of a contractually-enforceable relationship
resulting from 'membership' in the four State-funded retirement
systems'.... Indeed, they are among the most important benefits provided
by those systems."53  In other words, "Public Act 98-0599 . . . would
clearly result in the diminishment of the retirement annuities to which ...
[plaintiffs] . . .became entitled when they joined those systems."54
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. See id., 2015 EL 118585 ¶98, 32 N.E.3d at 30 ("For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the
circuit court declaring Public Act 98-599 to be unconstitutional and permanently enjoining its
enforcement is affirmed.").
51. Ill. Const. 1970, art. XIII, § 5.
52. Pension Reform Litig., 2015 IL 118585 145, 32 N.E.3d at 16.
53. Id., 2015 E 118585 147, 32 N.E.3d at 17.
54. Id.
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For these reasons, the Illinois Supreme Court ultimately held that:
"there was simply no way that the [retirement] . . . annuity reduction
provisions of Public Act 98-0599 can be reconciled with the rights and
protections established by the people of Illinois when they ratified the
Illinois Constitution of 1970 and its pension protection clause."55  Stated
simply, the court held that: "the General Assembly overstepped the scope of
its legislative power. This court is therefore obligated to declare [Public
Act 98-0599 to be constitutionally invalid as to this first issue]."56
In the wake of In Re Pension Reform Litigation, and other recent
cases,57 Illinois has been presented with a number of viable public pension
reform options. Some reforms, for example, called for better use of public
sector resources to limit unfunded pension liabilities.5 8  Others relied on
market-based reforms, which are prospective in nature.59 A third group of
options called for Illinois to fully comply with its own laws.60
The preceding discussion indicates that Pension Waiver Credits may
be an especially useful reform option because of their ability to address a
range of potential issues. For example, this tax expenditure encourages
each party to a public pension contract to fully comply with the applicable
55. Id.
56. Id. at 2015 L 118585 ¶47, 32N.E.3d at 18.
57. See, e.g., Mary J. Jones et al. v. Municipal Employees' Annuity and Benefit Fund of Chicago,
2014 CH 20027, Circuit Court of Cook County, Chancery Division (July 24, 2015),
http://chicagotonight.wttw.com/sites/default/files/article/file-attachments/
Chicago%20Pension%2ORuling.pdf; See Laura-Ann Wood, City Loses Effort to Change
Pensions, CHI. DAILY LAW BULLETIN (July 24, 2015),
http://www.chicagolawbulletin.com/Archives/2015/07/24/City-Pensions-Effort-7-24-2015.aspx:
A Cook County judge Friday rejected the city's attempt to scale back its worker
pension contributions to create a more sustainable retirement fund. Holding closely to
the Illinois Supreme Court's In Re Pension Reform Litigation ruling issued May 8,
Associate Judge Rita M. Novak held the Chicago plan is unconstitutional.
58. See Tom Kacich, Want to Fix the State Budget? Here's How, Says One Expert, NEWs GAZETTE
(Feb. 28, 2015), http://www.news-gazette.com/news/local/2015-04-28/want-fix-state-budget-
heres-how-says-one-expert.html ("Illinois can solve its multibillion-dollar fiscal problem, balance
the budget within two years and add billons to education funding in four steps [by changing its
budgetary approach].").
59. See Gregory G. Katsas, Brian J. Murray and Anthony J. Dick, The Skeptics Are Wrong: Rauner's
401(k)-style Pension Idea Will Work, CRAIN'S CHI. Bus. (May 12, 2015),
http://www.chicagobusiness.com/article/20150512/OPINION/I 50519943/the-skeptics-are-wrong-
rauners-40 I-k-style-pension-idea-will-work:
[Governor Bruce]... Rauner's proposal operates entirely on a going-forward basis: it
guarantees that workers will keep every cent of every pension benefit earned for past
service under current law, and it thus leaves current retirees unaffected. At the same
time, his proposal saves the state budget by slightly modifying the formula used to
calculate benefits based on future service.
60. See Sheila Weinberg, Do the math: Pension Crisis was Created - and Fueled - by Politicians,
CRAIN's CHI. Bus. (Aug. 12, 2015), http://www.chicagobusiness.com/article/20150812/
OPINION/150819935/do-the-math-pension-crisis-was-created-and-fueled-by-politicians ("The
state balanced budget requirement must be strengthened to prevent the accounting gimmicks that
have been used to balance the budget, while incurring $104.6 billion of pension debt.").
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law. Pension Waiver Credits also help each party to a public pension
contract to access their "dead capital,"6' so as to realize efficiency gains
that may close the gap between equities and annuities. Finally, in helping to
bring about efficiency gains that limit unfunded pension liabilities, the tax
expenditure reduces public pension i efficiencies.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Positive Analysis
To review, public pension contracts are formed whenever a public
employee is hired by the State of Illinois. 62 These common law contracts
require public employers to provide retirement annuity benefits to public
employees. Retirement annuity benefits, and other fringe benefits, such as
medical coverage,63 "receive the status of 'vested' rights at one of four
different points in the employment relationship: (1) when the employee
begins employment or joins the pension system; (2) after each day of
service provided by the employee; (3) when the employee satisfies the
eligibility requirements to receive a pension; or (4) when the employee
retires and begins receiving [benefits]."6 4
Within this context, retirement annuity benefits often are delivered
through defined-benefit pension plans6 5 that "[promise] . . . employees a
specified monthly benefit [upon] . . . retirement."66 As explained by In re
Pension Reform Litigation, retirement annuity benefits are constitutionally
protected from being unilaterally diminished or impaired.67 In other words,
unilateral modification is not a viable public pension reform option in
Illinois.
61. "Dead capital" is the idea that property has little-or-no-value when it cannot be made liquid.
Examples of dead capital, within the public sector contracts context, include government-owned
property that is not put to its best use (at least, for public employers such as the State of Illinois)
and the right to avoid the opportunity costs that are associated with deferred compensation (at
least, for public employees with public pensions). Cf Hernando de Soto, THE MYSTERY OF
CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM TRIUMPHS IN THE WEST AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE 6 (2000)
("[Examples of dead capital, at least within the context of development economics, include]
houses built on land whose ownership rights are not adequately recorded, unincorporated
businesses with undefined liability, [and] . . . industries located where financiers and investors
cannot see them [which limits access to capital].").
62. Seeln re Pension Reform Litig., 2015 IL 118585 14, 32 N.E.3d 1, 4 (Ill. 2015).
63. See LEXIS TAX ADVISOR FEDERAL TOPICAL § IB:4B.01 (Lexis 2015) ("The term 'fringe benefit'
refers exclusively to 'free' low-cost benefits conferred by employers on their employees.").
64. Madiar, supra note 13, at 181.
65. See Civic Federation, supra note 9, at 5 ("In Illinois nearly all public pension plans are defined-
benefit pension plans.").
66. Kelly Pitcher, Pension Plans In Distress: A Case Study of Cincinnati, 82 U. CIN. L. REv. 1271,
1274 (2014).
67. See Pension Reform Litig., 2015 IL 118585, ¶[40, 32 N.E.3d at 15.
2016] 211
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So, how can Illinois respond to the U.S. public pension crisis without
diminishing or impairing retirement annuity benefits? One option is to
encourage more bilateral modifications of public pension contracts. These
bilateral modifications may be achieved in several ways, including through
the use of Pension Waiver Credits. Pension Waiver Credits encourage the
execution of more bilateral modifications by providing fresh consideration
to each of the parties, i.e., public employers and public employees. This
additional consideration takes the form of a new tax credit allocation for
public employees, i.e., this tax expenditure provides early access to
retirement benefits, which would otherwise be accessible upon retirement,
and thereby provides fresh consideration for public employees, and the
legal right to discontinue offering defined-benefit pension plans, i.e., the
waiver of this legal duty, which would otherwise need to be discharged at
some point, serves as fresh consideration for public employers.
In other words, Pension Waiver Credits resolve the fresh consideration
dilemma for public pension contracts in Illinois.68  This dilemma is
overcome by using the tax expenditure to generate additional consideration
for each of the parties to a public pension contract. Pension Waiver Credits
do so, specifically, by operating as a common law accord and satisfaction.69
By definition, an accord and satisfaction is "the legal consequence of a
creditor's acceptance of a substitute performance for a previously existing
[contract] . . . claim or a prior original duty." 7 0 A valid accord and
satisfaction has three elements. These elements are that "there must be an
existing claim or duty, the parties must offer and accept a substitute
performance in full settlement of that existing claim or duty, and there must
be adequate consideration."71 In cases where each element is met, there is
no longer any legal claim or a duty.72  These claims or duties may be
extinguished, even if they are constitutionally protected, by executing a
waiver or a settlement.7 3
68. The requirement of fresh, or new, consideration was imposed in response to the common law pre-
existing duty rule. See Perillo, supra note 22, § 5.14.
69. See Sally Brown Richardson, Civil Law Compromise, Common Law Accord and Satisfaction:
Can the Two Doctrines Coexist in Louisiana? 69 LA. L. REv. 175, 182 (2008) ("In the American
common law, the term 'accord and satisfaction' is used to express the 'the legal consequence of a
creditor's acceptance of a substitute performance for a previously existing claim or prior original
duty.").
70. 13 Sarah Howard Jenkins, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS: Discharge § 70.1 at 301 (13th ed. 2003).
71. Richardson, supra note 69, at 187.
72. Id.
73. By use of the term "settlement," the article makes reference to the decision by a public employee
to give up the right to litigate a valid claim for retirement benefits in exchange for a monetary
payment by a public employer. See Albert Feuer, When Are Releases of Claims for ERISA Plan
Benefits Effective?, 38 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 773, 783 (2005).
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B. Normative Analysis
1. Program Overview
In light of the preceding analysis, public employees who waive their
rights to participate in a defined-benefit plan should receive Pension Waiver
Credits from public employers such as the State of Illinois.74 This tax credit
allocation must be, at least, equal in value to the retirement annuity benefit
that would be forfeited by executing an accord and satisfaction. The value
of each Pension Waiver Credits allocation should be computed, in present
value terms, as soon as the waiver is effective.75 As a result, the tax
expenditure could limit unfunded pension liabilities.
2. Program Design
Once a Pension Waiver Credits allocation is computed and distributed
by a public employer, in keeping with the requirements of a yet-to-be-
enacted authorizing statute that draws on elements of the Illinois Tax Credit
For Affordable Housing Donations,76 a tax credit certificate may be issued
to a participating public employee.77 Tax credit certificates generally
contain the terms and conditions of each allocation.7 1 Specific terms and
74. "Alienability," or the ability to transfer the value that is associated with an asset in exchange for
some valuable consideration, is an option because public pensions are not subject to the Employee
Retirement Security Act of 1974. Cf Eric D. Chason, Settlements and Waivers Affecting Pension
Benefits Under ERISA, 14 BENEFITS L.J. 61, 61-2 (2001):
Agreements that purport to waive settlements or settle claims under ERISA raise
unique issues [especially for tax-qualified retirement plans]. A primary issue ... is the
antialienation rule of ERISA. In essence, the antialienation rule says that retirement
plans can neither be sold nor made available to creditors of the employee (subject o
some exceptions).
75. The term "present value" is a synonym for the economic concept of "present discounted value."
By definition, present value is "the [current]. . . value of a payment due to be received in the
future. If the payment is due t periods into the future and the proportional interest rate is r per
period, the present discounted value of a sum A to be received t periods in the future is given by:
V=A/{ 1 + r)t = A(1 + r) - t." Black, supra note 7, at 363.
76. The author assumes that the Illinois Department of Central Management Services could serve as
the administrator of any future Pension Waiver Credits program. This state agency is uniquely-
situated to carry out this work, due to its broad experience with handling public employee benefits
and state property sales. See ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF CENTRAL MANAGEMENT SERVICES,
http://www.illinois.gov/cms/Pages/default.aspx. Another state agency that could play a major role
in implementing, and overseeing, Pension Waiver Credits is the Illinois Department of Revenue,
which has undertaken similar oversight work with the Illinois Tax Credit for Affordable Housing
Donations. Cf ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 86, § 100.2190 (2015) ("Tax Credit for Affordable Housing
Donations").
77. One precaution could consist of limiting the number of Pension Waiver Credits that may be
issued, or redeemed, in a given year. Cf ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 47, § 355 (2015) ("Illinois
Affordable Housing Tax Credit Program.").
78. Id.
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conditions of this tax expenditure may include restrictions on the overall
allocation size.
Within this context, Pension Waiver Credits could be redeemed in
several ways.so Tax credit certificates, for example, may be used to offset a
public employee's state tax liability. Among the taxes that could be offset
are the income tax" and the real estate transfer tax.82 The mix of tax types
also could be changed by public employers such as the State of Illinois, in
order to maximize total state tax revenues.
A second option is to trade-in Pension Waiver Credits for state-owned
property. This property could include vehicles, single-family homes and
commercial office space. These trades are likely to come at little cost, so
long as the state builds on its existing programs."
Pension Waiver Credits, lastly, may be freely transferred to any
eligible third-party.84 The term "eligible" could be defined in terms of
79. It is well-established that placing an upper limit on the total number of tax credits that may be
distributed, which is referred to as a "cap" or a "ceiling" on the tax credit allocation, provides
budgetary certainty. See, e.g., Mihir Desai et al., Investable Tax Credits: The Case of the Low
Income Housing Tax Credit, (HKS Faculty Research Working Paper 2008), available at
http://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Pages/item.aspx?num=33531 ("There may be political advantages to
capped credits, since there is then no budgetary uncertainty."). Other potential terms and
conditions may include restrictions on using tax credits, such as statutory time limits for
redemption. These terms and conditions may be adjusted, or even eliminated, in order to protect
the value of Pension Waiver Credits. Cf Ted Johnson, Louisiana Movie, TV Industry Fears
Slowdown After Limits Placed on Tax Credits, VARIETY (June 24, 2015),
http://variety.com/2015/artisans/news/bobby-jindal-president-movie-tv-tax-credit-1201527464/
("There ... has been concern that the value of... credits will drop with limits on redemption.").
80. Cf Kelli Harsch et al., Initiatives and Tools for the Preservation ofAffordable Housing in Illinois,
18 J. AFFORDABLE HousING 403, 405 (2009) ("An important feature of the donation credits is the
ability of the donor to either (i) use the credits to reduce its Illinois Income tax liability or (ii)
transfer the credits to other taxpayers. To facilitate such a transfer, the donation credit is issued in
the form of a certificate to the donor. Through its endorsement of the certificate, the donor can
transfer and assign all of its rights, title, and interest in the certificate and credits to a credit
purchaser.").
81. See ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 86, § 100 (2015) ("Income Tax.").
82. See ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 86, § 120 (2015) ("Real Estate Transfer Tax.").
83. Illinois has various websites that are dedicated to the sale of state-owned personal property. See,
e.g., IBID, THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, https://ibid.illinois.gov/index.php?. This state also has
positioned itself to sell-off certain state-owned real properties, especially commercial real estate
with higher-than-average operational costs. See, e.g., Greg Hinz, Get Ready to Say Goodbye to
the Thompson Center, CRAIN'S CHI. BusiNEss, Oct. 13, 2015,
http://www.chicagobusiness.com/article/20151013/BLOGSO2/151019965/get-ready-to-say-
goodbye-to-the-thompson-center ("Gov. Bruce Rauner has decided to move to sell and vacate the
James R. Thompson Center ... Rauner said the arguments in favor of a sale are 'compelling'...").
84. See, e.g., Josh Goodman, Tax Breaks for Sale: Transferable Tax Credits Explained, PEW
CHARITABLE TRUST, (Dec. 14, 2012), http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-
analysis/blogs/stateline/2012/12/14/tax-breaks-for-sale-transferable-tax-credits-explained ("[U.S.
states] .. . have become adept at providing tax breaks larger than business' tax burdens ... One
way they do that is though 'transferable' tax credits. If the value of the company's credits is
higher than its tax liability, it can sell the excess credits to another taxpayer who owes the state
taxes.").
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third-party compliance with state laws.ss This eligibility requirement may
limit certain transaction costs, 6  which are associated with program
administration, although non-financial barriers to trade could arise,
including bounded rationality," information problems," negotiation costs
and opportunism on the part of unrelated third parties. 9
3. Potential Benefits
Having explored positive and normative views of this yet-to-be
implemented tax expenditure, it is clear that Pension Waiver Credits could
yield a range of benefits. For example, U.S. states may benefit by
improving their liquidity and credit ratings.9 0 These fiscal improvements
could help jurisdictions, such as Illinois, to restructure their long-term debt
obligations.
Public employees also may benefit from this tax expenditure. These
benefits stem from the fact that public employees would be guaranteed to
receive the present value of their retirement annuity benefits. Pension
Waiver Credits, furthermore, encourage public employees to identify other
investment opportunities.91
In addition, third parties could benefit from Pension Waiver Credits.
These benefits may include the ability to avoid externalities,92 which too
85. Examples of potential eligibility criteria including being up-to-date with state taxes and licenses.
Cf ILL. HOUSING DEVELOPMENT AUTHORiTY, http://www.ihda.org/developer/IAHTC.htm.
86. See Posner, supra note 18, § 15.1 ("Transaction costs [are] ... the costs involved in organizing
economic activity through voluntary exchange.") Among the transaction costs that would be
avoided through the use of Pension Waiver Credits are: 1) the expenses that are associated with
holding, and investing, public pension funds over time; 2) the excessive payments that would be
otherwise made to a variety of legal persons, under defined-benefit pension plans, 3) payments
that go toward the underlying principle that is owed and 4) fixed, or variable, interest payments.
87. By definition, "bounded rationality" is "the argument that there is a finite limit to the amount of
information the human brain can hold, and the amount of calculations that it can understand ....
In practice individuals and organizations consider only a relatively small number of alternatives,
and frequently stop searching once they find a tolerable course of action, rather than seeking the
best possible." Black, supra note 7, at 36.
88. An example of an "information problem" is when "each participant in a market knows some
things the others do not, and does not know some things that other people do." Black, supra note
7, at 236.
89. See Black, supra note 7, at 473-74.
90. Cf S & P Revises Illinois Credit Rating Outlook to Negative, REUTERS (July 23, 2014),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/07/23/usa-illinois-sp-idUSL2NOPY29A20140723 ("Standard
& Poor's Rating Services ... warned that Illinois' already low credit rating could sink further if
the state is unable to implement reforms to curb its big unfunded pension liability and balance its
budget.").
91. See Investment Risk and Financial Advice, VANGUARD https://www.vanguard.co.uk/
documents/adv/literature/investor-risk-profiling.pdf.
92. Black, supra note 7, at 167 (An externality is "a cost or benefit arising from any activity which
does not accrue to the person or organization carrying on the activity.").
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often are imposed on third parties such as state taxpayers. Examples of
these externalities could include the costs of undertaking litigation.
4. Potential Criticisms
Special interest groups, nevertheless, still may oppose Pension Waiver
Credits.93 For example, interested third parties could seize on the fact that
public employees may not be fully protected.94 Members of this group
could include U.S. public sector unions and advocacy groups.95
A second category of special interest may withhold support simply
because the status quo is preferred.96 In fact, many of these interested third
93. British special interests groups raised a number of concerns when the United Kingdom undertook
public pension reform in 2014, especially about the potential tax implications of gaining earlier
access to vested pension benefits. C.f Ben Quinn, One in Eight People Plan to Cash in Their
Entire Pension Pot Next Year, GUARDIAN (Oct. 27, 2014),
http://www.theguardian.com/money/2014/oct/28/one-in-eight-people-cash-in-pension-pot-george-
osbome-reform:
Tom McPhail, head of pension research at Hargreaves Lansdown, told the Times [of
London]: 'Whilst we support the basic principles behind the government's reforms,
the speed and complexity of these changes mean that a lot of investors are going to be
paying unnecessarily large amounts of tax to the government. The chancellor has
effectively engineered a tax windfall for the government from unsuspecting pension
investors.'
Additional concerns also may be raised about the dangers of alienating public pensions, which
could echo the recent criticisms that have been lodged at structured settlements in the U.S. Cf
Terrence McCoy, The Flawed System that Allows Companies to Make Millions off the Injured,
WASH. POST (Dec. 27, 2015) https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/social-issues/the-flawed-
system-that-allows-companies-to-make-millions-off-the-injured/2015/12/27/ccel6434-9212-
1 le5-a2d6-f57908580blf story.html:
Unlike traditional settlements, which are paid out in one sum, structured settlements
dispense the payout in portions over a lifetime to protect vulnerable people from
immediately spending it all. Since 1975, insurance firms have committed an estimated
$350 billion to these agreements, spawning a secondary market in which companies
compete to buy payments for a smaller amount of upfront cash. Such deals, industry
advocates say, get desperate people the money that they need for emergencies and big
expenses, such as home purchases. But they also expose sellers to the risk that they
will exchange lifetimes' worth of income for pittances.
94. See Quinn, supra note 93; McCoy, supra note 93.
95. See, e.g., Michael T. Carrigan, Why 401(k)s Shouldn't Replace Pensions, HUFFINGTON POST
(Dec. 28, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/michael-t-carrigan/why-401ks-shouldnt-
replac_b_6367062.html:
New data from the National Institution for Retirement Security . . . shows just how
much Illinois taxpayers stand to lose if we switch to privatized accounts. To provide
workers with the same modest retirement benefits, traditional pensions are 48 percent
less expensive than 401(k)-style plans. That's a 48 percent savings to Illinois
taxpayers.
96. See, e.g., Thomas P. Napoli, Retirement Security for Americans and the Role of Defined-Benefit
Pension Plans, 72 PuB. ADMIN. REV. 483 (2012).
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parties could bristle at making any change to the public pension system.9 7
Examples may include pension fund managers and placement agents.98
A final set of special interests may question the wisdom of issuing
Pension Waiver Credits. Some members of this group could argue that
there are too many tax expenditures already.99 These interested third
parties are likely to be drawn from the large population of U.S. elected
officials. 100
5. Response to Critics
This opposition, nonetheless, could be overcome in a variety of ways.
First, U.S. states may point out that Pension Waiver Credits are different
from other tax expenditures. Specifically, these governments could show
how Pension Waiver Credits help U.S. states to make better use of public
sector resources. One representative example is described, i.e., Illinois, in
this article.
U.S. states also may highlight the problems with the public pension
status quo.101  These problems include excessive payouts, optimistic
97. See generally Steven Davidoff Solomon, After Scandals, Evaluating Pension Funds' Middleman,
N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/13/business/dealbook/after-pay-to-
play-scandals-evaluating-pension-funds-middleman.html?_r-0 ("Placement agents have been
maligned, banned and even imprisoned. And yet, pension funds continue to use them.").
98. Id.
In 1991, placement agents were nonexistent. But in mid-2014 ... they were involved
in 41 percent of the fundraising for North American private equity firms . ... For
example, the California Public Employees' Retirement System, the large state pension
agency better known as Calpers, invested in 784 funds using placement agents from
1991 to 2011 .... That's about 27 percent of the funds Calpers invested in during that
time.
99. See, e.g., Leonard E. Burman & Marvin Phaup, Tax Expenditures, the Size and Efficiency of
Government, and Implications for Budget Reform (NBER Working Paper Series 2012)
http://www.nber.org/papers/wl6728:
One possible explanation for the difficulty in controlling the budget is that a major
component of spending-tax expenditures-receives privileged status . . . This paper
explores the implications of that classification and illustrates how it can lead to higher
taxes, larger government, and an inefficient mix of spending (too many tax
expenditures).
100. See, e.g., Patrick McGreevy, Citing Past Budget Anxiety, Gov. Brown Vetoes Several New Tax
Credits, L.A. TIMES, Oct., 2015, http://www.latimes.com/local/political/la-me-pc-citing-budget-
gov-brown-vetoes-several-new-tax-credits-2015 01 0-story.html:
[California] . . . Gov. Brown . . . vetoed nine bills that would have provided new tax
credits to benefit California lawmakers' priorities . . . . Brown reminded lawmakers
that when he took office in 2011 the state faced a $26.6-billion budget deficit and
estimated shortfalls of $20 billion and it has taken tough measures to turn around the
state's finances.
101. See, e.g., Peter Conti-Brown, Direct Democracy and State Fiscal Crises: The Problem of Too
Much Law, 7 DuKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL. 43, 43-4 (2012):
[What] . . . if the problem facing the [U.S.] . . . states is not a problem of too much
debt, but one of too much law? Put differently, state debt crises might be symptomatic
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projections and modest contributions.102 Each problem arises, as illustrated
in a recent study, from questionable decisions made by public pension
managers.10 3
Lastly, U.S. states could take additional steps to protect public
employees. For example, U.S. states may provide alternatives to fully
monetizing retirement annuity benefits. One option is to permit rollovers,
especially into state-administered defined-contribution pension plans.104
This alternative could be made immediately available, or only after an
initial draw-down.0 5
6. Implementation Plan
Fortunately, the concerns about Pension Waiver Credits may be
overcome by creating a detailed implementation plan. This plan could be
drafted, and implemented, in several ways. State officials may do the
drafting, although public employees should have some input.' 6
In creating this implementation plan, U.S. states may engage in
collective bargaining. This approach could lead some governments to
collaborate with U.S. public sector unions and individual public employees.
As a result, there may be little need to pursue unilateral modifications.
of a deeper crisis whereby the state fiscal policy-making process is gummed up by
statutory and constitutional restrictions on the use of public [sector] ... resources, such
that combating budget shortfalls-whether caused by economic recession, political
gridlock or some combination of the two-becomes increasingly unlikely.
102. See Moore, supra note 10, at 260 ("Many factors contributed to the current level of underfunding.
These include: missed state contributions, loss in the value of plan assets, inaccurate valuing and
reporting methods, cost of living adjustments that exceeded the rate of inflation, and short-sighted
benefit increases.").
103. See Solomon, supra note 97 ("A new study . . . finds. . . private equity funds using placement
agents underperformed the market by as much as 3.5 percent annually. In other words, most
pension funds appear not to get value from placement agents.").
104. See Civic Federation, supra note 9, at 6:
A defined contribution plan combines a fixed employer contribution (the contribution
is 'defined') with employee contributions in an individual retirement savings account.
The funds in the account are generally invested according to choices made by the
employee. The retirement benefit is then based on the value in the account when the
worker retires. Employees are not guaranteed a specific benefit . . . . Common
examples of defined contribution plans are 401(k), 403(b) and 457 plans.
105. See Topic 413 - Rollovers from Retirement Plans, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, (Jan. 04, 2016),
http://www.irs.gov/taxtopics/tc4l3.html ("A rollover occurs when you withdraw cash or other
assets from one eligible retirement plan and contribute all or part of it, within 60 days, to another
eligible retirement plan. This rollover transaction is not taxable, but it is reportable on your
federal tax income.").
106. See Jodi DiCenzo, Employees' Retirement Choices, Perceptions and Understanding: A Review of
Selected Survey and Empirical Behavioral Decision-Making Research 5, SOCIETY OF ACTUARIES
(2014), https://www.soa.org/research/research-projects/pension/research-can-annuity.aspx (click
Employees' Retirement Choices, Perceptions and Understanding: A Review of Selected Survey
and Empirical Behavioral Decision-Making Research under related links) ("Decision-making
context has a dramatic impact on [retirement plan] . .. participation and contribution decisions.").
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Alternately, U.S. states could negotiate directly with individual public
employees. This option is likely to have relatively high transaction costs, at
least in comparison with other options. Direct negotiation, nevertheless,
may be justified if it increases the participation rate.10 7
Finally, U.S. states may ask their legislatures to codify any negotiated
agreements. This approach has a number of potential benefits, as it could
be used on its own or in combination with other reforms.os These benefits
may arise from increased transparency or, possibly, less dissent.
IV. CONCLUSION
This article identifies a novel approach to public pension reform,
which takes into account existing political and legal constraints. It does its
work in at least four ways. First, the article encourages better use of public
sector resources by calling for the elimination of public pension
inefficiencies. Next, it explains how to limit public pension inefficiencies,
at least on a prospective basis, by moving away from defined-benefit
pension plans. Third, the article describes one way to move beyond
defined-benefit pension plans through the creation of a new tax expenditure
program, specifically, a Pension Waiver Credits Program. Finally, it
explains how to implement this new tax expenditure program so as to
address the U.S. public pension crisis.
Ultimately, U.S. states should consider Pension Waiver Credits, at
least as a partial solution to the public pension crisis, because this new tax
expenditure concept is a viable alternative to tax increases and spending
cuts.109 It also draws attention to dead capital,''0 such as unclaimed
property,"' which is rarely exploited by most governments.12  Lastly,
107. See id. at 136 ("Prohibiting inertia by requiring a participation decision (either positive or
negative) has increased [some public employee] enrollment rates .. . by nearly 30 percent.").
108. Many public pension reformers are focused on tax increases or spending cuts, which both require
legislative action and could be used in concert with Pension Waiver Credits. See, e.g., Chris
Fusco, Dan Mihalopoulos and Patrick Rehkamp, Generous Pension Benefits Only One Part of
State, City Financial Crisis, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Sept. 17, 2015, http://chicago.suntimes.com/the-
watchdogs/7/71/61245 1/watchdogs-generous-benefits-one-part-state-city-pension-mess ("The
only solutions appear to be to somehow cut expenses-which are made up largely of personnel
costs-or generate increased revenues. And the quickest, surest way to raise a lot of revenue
could be a property tax increase."). None of these reform options, however, are likely to prevent
future public pension crises. Future crises may be avoided, only, by more informed state
decision-making.
109. See Lay & Grundman, supra note 2, at 2.
110. See de Soto, supra note 61 at 6.
111. See, e.g., Jordan M. Goodman, Unclaimed Property, Illinois Institute for Continuing Legal
Education 13.4-5 (2010) ("All 50 [U.S.] ... states have enacted unclaimed property statutes . ...
The Illinois Uniform Disposition of Unclaimed Property Act (Illinois Act), 765 ILCS 1025/0.05,
et seq., is modeled on the 1966 Revised Uniform Disposition of Unclaimed Property Act.").
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Pension Waiver Credits could help U.S. states to make better use of their
public sector resources.
These governments, however, should avoid situations that reduce the
effectiveness of Pension Waiver Credits. For example, U.S. states may
limit conflicts of interest. One way to do so is to set clear administrative
rules, especially with respect to the relationship between program
participants and administrators. The Illinois Tollway used this approach
successfully.113
U.S. states, moreover, should eliminate any unjustified use of public
sector resources.114  By doing so, these governments could increase the
demand for Pension Waiver Credits over time. Other tax expenditure
programs, such as federal tax credit programs, provide useful examples.115
Lastly, sub-national governments should assure the long-term viability
of Pension Waiver Credits. One way to do so is by shielding this tax
expenditure from collateral attacks. An example of how to carry out an
attack is by using a repeal option such as the Illinois Regulatory Sunset
Law." 6
Regardless of how U.S. states design their programs, it is clear why
they may need Pension Waiver Credits. First, this tax expenditure
encourages the parties to a public pension contract to voluntarily modify
their agreement. Pension Waiver Credits also help each party to access
their "dead capital," so as to realize efficiency gains. Finally, in bringing
about these efficiency gains, the tax expenditure partially addresses the U.S.
public pension crisis.
112. Cf Lisa Prevost, A Start-up Helps Towns Market Their Property, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 2014,
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/06/business/a-start-up-uses-the-web-to-help-towns-market-
their-property.html?_r-0 ("Two public policy graduates at the Kennedy School at Harvard
University are trying to build a business of helping municipalities with a task at which they are
notoriously deficient: managing and marketing their real estate portfolios.").
113. Cf, Auctions and Real Estate, Vehicles, Equipment and Surplus Inventory, ILL. TOLLWAY,
http://www.illinoistollway.com/doing-business/auctions-real-estate ("Illinois Tollway directors,
employees, consultants, their spouses, children or any person having any direct involvement with
the disposition of Illinois Tollway surplus property may not bid on or purchase Illinois Tollway
Property.").
114. See, e.g., Randall K. Johnson, Who Wins Residential Property Tax Appeals, 6 COLUM. J. TAx. L.
209 (2015) (finding that the filing, and granting, of unnecessary residential property tax appeals
may constitute an unjustified use of public sector resources).
115. See, e.g., Karen Dynan, Ted Gayer and Natasha Plotkin, An Evaluation of Federal and State
Homebuyer Tax Incentives 10 n.12, BROOKINGs (2013), http://www.brookings.edul-/
media/research/files/papers/2013/06/28-homebuyer-tax-incentives-dynan-
gayer/28 homebuyer tax incentives dynan~gayer2.pdf ("Fraud ... likely reduced the impact of
the [certain federal] . . . credits on housing activity. However, the amount of fraud appears to
have been small relative to the total size of the program.").
116. See 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 90/1-14 (2015) ("Regulatory Sunset Act").
[Vol. 40220
